San Juan Pools and or Utah Insurance Fund v. David D. Sweeney, Utah State Second Injury Fund and Utah State Industrial Commission : Vaughn\u27s Heating and Appliance and or Utah State Insurance Fund v. Mike Maupin and Second Injury Fund and Utah State Industrial Commission : Reply Brief by Utah Supreme Court
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs
1985
San Juan Pools and or Utah Insurance Fund v.
David D. Sweeney, Utah State Second Injury Fund
and Utah State Industrial Commission : Vaughn's
Heating and Appliance and or Utah State Insurance
Fund v. Mike Maupin and Second Injury Fund and
Utah State Industrial Commission : Reply Brief
Utah Supreme Court
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Russell Hadley, Esq.; Kunz, Kunz and Hadley; Lennard W. Stillman; Johnson and Stillman.
Fred R. Silvester, Esq.; Black and Moore.
This Reply Brief is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme Court
Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Reply Brief, San Juan Pools v. Sweeney, No. 198520460.00 (Utah Supreme Court, 1985).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc1/521
UTAH CU« 
THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
V/gSTO^® — - — -
SAN JUAN POOLS and/or UTAH 
INSURANCE FUND, 
Plaintiffs on Appeal/ 
Appellants, 
vs. 
DAVID D. SWEENEY, UTAH STATE 
SECOND INJURY FUND and UTAH 
STATE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION, 
Defendants on Appeal/ 
Respondents. 
VAUGHN'S HEATING & APPLIANCE 
and/or UTAH STATE INSURANCE 
FUND, 
Plaintiffs on Appeal/ 
Appellants, 
vs. 
MIKE MAUPIN and SECOND INJURY 
FUND, and UTAH STATE INDUSTRIAL 
COMMISSION, 
Defendants on Appeal/ 
Respondents. 
Case No. 20460 
Case No. 20474 
REPLY BRIEF 
Russell Hadley, Esq. 
Kunz, Kunz & Hadley 
175 South West Temple, #500 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Lennard W. Stillman 
Johnson & Stillman 
12 Exchange Place 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Fred R. Silvester, Esq. 
BLACK & MOORE 
261 East Broadway, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
AUG 81985 
won, Supreme Court, Utah 
THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
SAN JUAN POOLS and/or UTAH 
INSURANCE FUND, 
Plaintiffs on Appeal/ 
Appellants, 
vs. 
DAVID D. SWEENEY, UTAH STATE 
SECOND INJURY FUND and UTAH 
STATE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION, 
Defendants on Appeal/ 
Respondents. 
VAUGHN'S HEATING & APPLIANCE 
and/or UTAH STATE INSURANCE 
FUND, 
Plaintiffs on Appeal/ 
Appellants, 
vs. 
MIKE MAUPIN and SECOND INJURY 
FUND, and UTAH STATE INDUSTRIAL 
COMMISSION, 
Defendants on Appeal/ 
Respondents. 
Case No. 20460 
Case No. 20474 
REPLY BRIEF 
Russell Hadley, Esq. 
Kunz, Kunz & Hadley 
175 South West Temple, #500 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Lennard W. Stillman 
Johnson & Stillman 
12 Exchange Place 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Fred R. Silvester, Esq. 
BLACK & MOORE 
261 East Broadway, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
SUMMARY OF REPLY ARGUMENTS 
ARGUMENT . . 
POINT I: THE SECOND INJURY FUND'S ARGUMENT 
THAT THE "SUBSTANTIALLY GREATER 
TEST" WAS NOT MET BY THE EMPLOYERS 
IN BOTH OF THESE CONSOLIDATED CASES 
IS INCONSISTENT WITH THE COMMISSION'S 
OWN FINDINGS 
POINT II: THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION WAS 
ARBITRARY BY AWARDING PERMANENT 
COMPENSATION BUT FAILED TO ALLOCATE 
MEDICAL CARE AND TEMPORARY COMPEN-
SATION BASED UPON THE COMBINED 
INJURIES 
Ease 
l 
2 
CONCLUSION 6 
Cases,Cited 
Page 
Day's MarKet« Inc. v,., Mit, 
669 P.2d 440 (Utah, 1983) 3,4 
Other Authorities Cited 
Utah Code Annotated, Section 35-1-69 2,3,4,5 
THE SUPREME COURT OP THE STATE OF UTAH 
SAN JUAN POOLS and/or UTAH 
INSURANCE FUND, 
Plaintiffs on Appeal/ 
Appellants, 
vs. 
DAVID D. SWEENEY, UTAH STATE 
SECOND INJURY FUND and UTAH 
STATE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION, 
Defendants on Appeal/ 
Respondents. 
VAUGHN'S HEATING & APPLIANCE 
and/or UTAH STATE INSURANCE 
FUND, 
Plaintiffs on Appeal/ 
Appellants, 
vs. 
MIKE MAUPIN and SECOND INJURY 
FUND, and UTAH STATE INDUSTRIAL 
COMMISSION, 
Defendants on Appeal/ 
Respondents. 
REPLY BRIEF 
SUMMARY OF REPLY ARGUMENTS 
A. The Industrial Commission's failure to allocate 
temporary total compensation and medical benefits is inconsistent 
with its award of permanent partial disability compensation to 
both Mr. Maupin and Mr. Sweeney, making the findings arbitrary and 
capricious. 
Case No. 20460 
Case No. 20474 
B. Utah Code Annotated, Sect. 35-1-69, prescribes a 
formula for determining the Second Injury Fund's contributions to 
employers in cases of combined disability, 
ARGUMENTS 
POINT I 
THE SECOND INJURY FUND'S ARGUMENT THAT THE 
"SUBSTANTIALLY GREATER TEST" WAS NOT MET BY 
THE EMPLOYERS IN BOTH OF THESE CONSOLIDATED 
CASES IS INCONSISTENT WITH THE COMMISSION'S 
OWN FINDINGS. 
As was clearly pointed out by the Second Injury Fund in 
its brief, the Second Injury Fund was required to pay the appli-
cant David D. Sweeney compensation for permanent partial impair-
ment in the amount of $6,722,00 and was also required to pay the 
applicant Mike Maupin compensation for permanent partial impair-
ment in the amount of $2,347. These awards were made by the 
Administrative Law Judge and upheld by the Commission based on the 
medical panel's assessment of the percentage of pre-existing 
incapacity in both the applicants. 
While it is the employers' and the State Insurance 
Fund's position in these cases that the 1981 amendments to 
Section 69 require an absolute allocation of temporary total 
compensation and medical benefits where the 10/20 Rule is met (See 
appellants' brief at pgs. 5-9) even if the Second Injury Fund 
argument is correct that the 10/20 Rule does not give an absolute 
standard for determining substantially greater, the award of 
Second Injury Fund benefits for permanent partial incapacity to 
each of the applicants can only be done under the statute if the 
2 
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of 10% or greater and the total physical impairment from all 
causes and conditions is greater than 20% pursuant to Utah Code 
Annotated, Sect. 35-1-69(1)(b); or 
3. The Industrial Commission makes a finding that the 
permanent incapacity is substantially greater than it would have 
been had not the pre-existing incapacity been present. See: Days 
MarKetr Inc»r 669 P.2d at 442. 
In the instant cases, both Mr. Maupin and Mr. Sweeney 
meet the later two criteria. Both applicants for workers1 
compensation had pre-existing incapacities, both had industrial 
injuries resulting in permanent physical impairment greater than 
10%, and both had total permanent physical impairment in excess of 
20%. Additionally, both applicants for workers' compensation, by 
implication from the Industrial Commission's award of Second 
Injury Fund benefits for their pre-existing permanent physical 
impairments, have suffered substantially greater impairments as a 
result of their pre-existing conditions. Clearly, the Industrial 
Commission is not in a position to award Second Injury Fund 
benefits for permanent impairments without also meeting the 
substantially greater test, which is argued in the Second Injury 
Fund brief. 
POINT II 
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION WAS ARBITRARY BY 
AWARDING PERMANENT COMPENSATION BUT FAILED TO 
ALLOCATE MEDICAL CARE AND TEMPORARY COMPEN-
SATION BASED UPON THE COMBINED INJURIES. 
The Second Injury Fund, in its brief, made several 
references to the percentage of medical care and temporary total 
4 
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the Second Injury Fund to argue that the allocations in these two 
cases would be "unfair". 
CONCLUSION 
The State Insurance Fundf as compensation carrier for 
both Mr. Maupinfs and Mr. Sweeney's employers, is entitled to 
allocation of temporary total compensation and medical benefits 
because in both cases, the combined impairments meet the statu-
torily defined standard for substantially greater, i.e. both have 
10% or greater permanent incapacity as a result of the industrial 
accident and combined incapacities in excess of 20%. In addition, 
both applicant's for workers' compensation have permanent incapa-
cities that are substantially greater than they would have been 
but for the pre-existing incapacities by virtue of the Commis-
sion's award of permanent partial compensation to each of the 
applicants from the Second Injury Fund for the incapacities 
resulting from pre-existing conditions. 
When the determination of "substantially greater" has 
been made either under the statutory 10/20 formula or, because the 
Commission made an award for permanent incapacities based on 
pre-existing conditions, it is the absolute duty of the Commission 
under the statute to allocate medical expenses and temporary total 
compensation based on the combined disabilities. 
DATED this WrTL day of August, 1985. 
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